Why Is American Foreign Policy So Erratic?

Proposing a small revision to an otherwise great framework for understanding US foreign policy

It’s been often noted that American foreign policy throughout its history has been irregular, unpredictable, and even contradictory. Compared to the more consistent brand of European realism forged by the likes of Machiavelli and Richelieu, the United States’ rotating fits of muscular expansionism, isolationism, and idealist internationalism has left many spectators scratching their heads.

Over the course of the last 150 years, the US has jumped from eagerly fighting the Spanish, to reluctantly joining World War I, to eagerly proposing international guidelines and architecture following the war, to immediately voting against those guidelines and the League of Nations, to reluctantly joining World War II, to eagerly supporting and funding anti-communist governments after WWII, to reluctantly intervening in conflicts in the 90’s, to eagerly intervening in conflicts in the 2000’s, and finally now to be unsure of whether to intervene more or less or where or with whom.

Why has US foreign policy been so erratic? In short, the answer is geography. The degree to which a country embraces a realist foreign policy is a function of that country’s likelihood of being invaded. In general, the less secure a country’s borders, the more it needs to adopt a realist approach to international relations.

“To know a country’s geography is to know their foreign policy”

- Napoleon

The abrasive realism of China and Russia, for example, is not a recent phenomenon, but was instead forged over millennia by the constant threat of invasion from various steppe nomads. With this lens, it’s clear that Putin is not a groundbreaking leader, but is instead just the latest in a long line of Russian autocrats with a neurotic need for expansion. Russian expansionism is a drive that has existed since the Mongols conquered Kievan Rus in the 13^th century. For centuries, Russians have looked out over the vast Eurasian heartland and correctly concluded that the only way to secure a frontier is to push it back.

Long, featureless, and unprotected borders breed suspicion and weariness of neighbors, as well as an authoritarian and collectivist ethos that can decisively respond to external threats. When security is low, the risk of a poor foreign policy is extinction. Therefore, the only foreign policy available is a realist approach that treats neighbors as competitors.

On the opposite end of both the Eurasian landmass and the spectrum of secure borders, Britain’s natural moat of the English Channel and the North Sea affords it a level of international security that Russians and Chinese can only dream of. Britain’s relative safety compared to its European neighbors allowed it to develop a foreign policy less focused on realist assumptions. With extra security comes the ability to develop a more idealistic foreign policy built around international alliances, the promotion of free trade, and mutually beneficial commercial opportunities. When security is high, the risks of a poor foreign policy are mitigated by geography, which allows more varied and idealist foreign policy approaches to be tried over time without catastrophe.

Extending this logic to the United States, which has one of the most secure geographic positions in the world due to its saltwater moats and two unthreatening neighbors, the reason for America’s rich variety of approaches to foreign policy becomes clear.

Walter Russell Mead argues that throughout American history there have been four distinct and often competing approaches to US foreign policy. I agree with three of his four, but I’ll argue that one of Mead’s approaches should be replaced by a different approach.

Mead’s four foreign policy types are named after four US statesmen who best embody their tenets. Chronologically, the four types are Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Jacksonian, and Wilsonian.

Hamiltonian Tradition

The Hamiltonian approach to foreign policy derives from the British tradition (and the Dutch tradition before them) of focusing on the promotion of economic interests through naval power. Hamiltonians advocate for a strong alliance between the government and business to promote national prosperity and global economic leadership. They support international trade, a stable financial system, strong international alliances, and the maintenance of a strong military to protect American economic interests abroad. This approach is fairly realist and is not inherently hawkish. According to this view, having a strong military (and navy especially) is important insofar as they further the goals of securing peace and promoting free trade so that economic growth can be maximized. The US’ role as the global hegemon and policer of international waters since the end of World War II has reflected a Hamiltonian approach to foreign policy.

Jeffersonian Tradition

The Jeffersonian approach prioritizes the preservation of American democracy by avoiding entanglements in foreign conflicts. Jeffersonians are generally skeptical of foreign interventions and international commitments that might compromise American independence or lead to unnecessary wars. They emphasize the need to focus on domestic affairs and protect the American way of life from foreign influences. This tradition can best be characterized as isolationist, and it was expressed during the inter-war period in the US.

Jacksonian Tradition

The Jacksonian tradition reflects a populist approach to foreign policy, emphasizing national honor and a strong defense against external threats. Jacksonians are typically suspicious of international institutions and alliances, preferring a more unilateral approach to defending American interests. They believe in a robust military response when American security is threatened but are generally opposed to foreign wars that do not directly affect the United States.

This is probably the most poorly understood of the four traditions given its populist and somewhat contradictory nature. In a recent article for the WSJ, Mead described the Jacksonian approach as follows: “Absent serious threats against America, Jacksonians have little interest in foreign affairs. But when the US is attacked, they believe every measure is justified in its defense.”

This “agnostic-until-provoked” approach is best characterized by the staunch turn in public opinion following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Only slightly more than half of Americans favored war with the Axis in late 1941. Several days after Pearl Harbor, that figure had risen to 97%. That swing in support, ultimately culminating in massive public support for the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, showcases the Jacksonian tradition’s preference for isolationism until attacked, in which case the preferred Jacksonian response is fire and brimstone.

Wilsonian Tradition

The Wilsonian tradition is the most idealist approach. It is characterized by the belief that the United States has a moral obligation to spread democracy and human rights worldwide. Wilsonians support international institutions, multilateral cooperation, and the promotion of international law to achieve a peaceful and just global order. They see American values as universal and believe that promoting democracy abroad is both a moral imperative and in America's long-term interest. This tradition was ascendant following the fall of the Soviet Union and the seeming dominance of liberalism, but it has since lost much favor following US failures in Iraq and Afghanistan.

My Changes: Drop the Jeffersonian Approach…

I think Mead’s analysis is great and offers a solid framework for understanding the various strains of American foreign policy throughout its history. The oscillating nature of American foreign policy makes sense after understanding that all four of these approaches are rooted in deeply held views about America’s role in the world, and that even when one view seems ascendant, the others are always lurking under the surface, waiting for a foreign policy misstep or opportunity to regain the democratic spotlight. In fact, it is the competition between these foreign policy types, in true Madisonian fashion, that has allowed US foreign policy to be so successful since the founding. America’s unique mix of rotating realist and idealist foreign policy approaches, coupled with its incredible geography, has resulted in extremely positive foreign policy outcomes when looking at the long view.

The one deletion I’d make to Mead’s framework is to get rid of the Jeffersonian tradition. I believe the Jeffersonian tradition was more a precursor to the Jacksonian tradition than a true competing approach. Both approaches share a general desire for isolationism and are rooted in rural populism. Jefferson’s ideal of a “nation of small farmers” are the exact people who ultimately elected Jackson, even though Jefferson himself was more of a cavalier aristocrat. Despite his isolationist tendencies, Jefferson even showed Jacksonian flairs by fighting the First Barbary War, so I think the distinction between them is small enough to not warrant a separate category in this analysis.

…And Replace It With Kennanism

Instead, I’d argue the foreign policy approach that should replace the Jeffersonian approach is the Kennanian tradition, named after George F. Kennan, the American diplomat who outlined the US policy of containment against the Soviet Union in his 1946 "Long Telegram".

This approach was born during the Cold War and is centered on the singular mission of outmaneuvering and triumphing over a rival great power in a bipolar or multipolar world. Unlike every other approach, Kennanism is inherently confrontational. It is also the most realist of the approaches, as shown by the US’ frequent support of illiberal regimes during the Cold War, so long as they denounced communism.

The Kennanian approach is zero-sum and narrowly focused, with a clear-eyed realist view of both who the adversary is and what a US victory would look like (typically regime change). Obviously, this approach was favored during the Cold War, but it has also seen a recent bipartisan resurgence as the threat from China has become more acute in recent decades.

In hindsight and with the benefit of post-Cold War security, it’s easy to dismiss the realism of Kennanism as paranoid and misguided. The US certainly made many foreign policy mistakes during the Cold War, but ultimately the US prevailed due in large part to Kennan’s containment doctrine. The security threat posed by the Soviet Union was real, so a hyper-realist foreign policy at the time made sense. Again, as the risk of attack goes up, the need for adopting a realist foreign policy also goes up.

Kennanism is also unique in that it reframes how the US thinks about its relationship with every country and region. Whereas international relationships tend to be discrete and distinct in the other approaches, the Kennanian approach instead frames every international relationship as a part of the broader struggle against the primary adversary. Rather than thinking about our relationship with, say, India, Saudi Arabia, and Finland as separate and isolated, the Kennanian approach would instead think of each of these relationships as pieces of the broader puzzle that is resisting (or containing) the adversary.

This transactional approach to international relations is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it clarifies strategic goals for each international relationship and increases the importance of each relationship since every country has a role to play in the broader struggle. On the other hand, this approach can make each relationship seem more important than it really is, as evidenced by the US decision to continue to pour resources and manpower into the Vietnam War well after the decision to continue the war had turned against American interests. Of course, a more idealist approach can lead to the same outcome, as shown by the largely Wilsonian wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.

As China has continued to contest US hegemony and enlist autocratic allies willing to do the same, the Kennanian approach to foreign policy could see a resurgence. In my next post, I’ll look at how these four approaches have interacted over the past 35 years and how the emerging fight between the Jacksonian and Kennanian approaches will be on the ballot this November.

Do you disagree with these four categories? Are there any you would add, drop, or revise? Let me know in the comments below.