Interesting article. I think what you call Kennanism has had limited impact on American foreign policy thinking. It harkens back to a European-style realism that is best represented by Metternich in the early 19th century. It’s only real practitioners in American history were Kissinger and Nixon. As you point out, the Cold War coalition is best seen as an alliance of Wilsonians and Hamiltonians.
American foreign wars acquire widespread popular support when it combines national interests (realism) and national values (idealism). We can see this in the American Revolution, Civil war, WWI, WWII and the Cold War. Idealism alone is not enough when victory is not immediate and decisive. Realism on the other hand is not enough to get popular support unless the nation is attacked like Pearl Harbor.
For these reasons, a value-free realism will likely never be popular in the US. But since our rivals are almost always aggressive, undemocratic regimes, then it is not too hard to see both interests and values at stake. Both Communist China and Putin’s Russia fit the mold of adversaries of the past.
I liked your post, but I don't find Putin's Russia or the CCP particularly "aggressive". Neither represent a totalitizing ideological threat. One isn't even a practical threat, and both have major demographic headwinds. They feel more like 19th century adversaries.
Furthermore, actual Great Power Conflict is completely obsolete with modern weaponry. That wasn't true early in the Cold War, when MAD wasn't established yet.
The primary goal of the US is not to start some stupid war that ends civilization. The primary enemy in this is the NATSEC ecosystem. I wish we could just buy them off by paying their Arlington mortgages, but it doesn't work that way.
If the CCP is nothing else, I'd say they are totalizing and ideological. Authoritarian, repressive, and illiberal in every sense of the word. Agree they both have headwinds, but so does the US. All legitimate threats will still have some headwinds, so just because a threat has headwinds doesn't mean you should ignore the threat.
Also wouldn't agree that great power conflict is obsolete. People argued that war was obsolete prior to WW1 and were obviously proved wrong. We've also banned weapons in the past and nuclear may be no different. A war for survival may result in MAD, but a war for territory where neither home country is threatened, say for Taiwan, could absolutely turn hot without turning nuclear.
Agreed Kennanism has been limited in the past. That's probably why Mead didn't include it in his original four types. But it does seem to be making a comeback due to the threat of China and Russia. I do think it was the driving force behind our Cold War foreign policy, even before and after Kissinger. Reagan and Kennedy may have added flairs of Wilsonian sentiment to bolster public support, but at their core the foreign policy actions all administrations took from the late 40's through the late 80's were centered on the containment doctrine.
Definitely agree that a mix of realism and idealism is needed for widespread public support. You see appeals to both in support for Ukraine. I'm curious which approach you think tends to lend itself best to progress and prosperity?
As for a foreign policy that is best for progress and prosperity, that is a tough one. I would guess some blend of Hamiltonianism plus Wilsonism justifications along with a strong dash of hubris to avoid getting into long expensive wars that we cannot win.
Kennan played an important role in waking up the State department and foreign policy experts as to the threat of the Soviet Union, but if you look at the specifics that he wanted, his influence was fairly limited. Truman did his own thing and most other presidents followed his lead.
I would argue that Truman, JFK, and LBJ all pushed hard on the ideals of fighting against Communists. Eisenhower and Truman less so.
Interesting article. I think what you call Kennanism has had limited impact on American foreign policy thinking. It harkens back to a European-style realism that is best represented by Metternich in the early 19th century. It’s only real practitioners in American history were Kissinger and Nixon. As you point out, the Cold War coalition is best seen as an alliance of Wilsonians and Hamiltonians.
American foreign wars acquire widespread popular support when it combines national interests (realism) and national values (idealism). We can see this in the American Revolution, Civil war, WWI, WWII and the Cold War. Idealism alone is not enough when victory is not immediate and decisive. Realism on the other hand is not enough to get popular support unless the nation is attacked like Pearl Harbor.
For these reasons, a value-free realism will likely never be popular in the US. But since our rivals are almost always aggressive, undemocratic regimes, then it is not too hard to see both interests and values at stake. Both Communist China and Putin’s Russia fit the mold of adversaries of the past.
I liked your post, but I don't find Putin's Russia or the CCP particularly "aggressive". Neither represent a totalitizing ideological threat. One isn't even a practical threat, and both have major demographic headwinds. They feel more like 19th century adversaries.
Furthermore, actual Great Power Conflict is completely obsolete with modern weaponry. That wasn't true early in the Cold War, when MAD wasn't established yet.
The primary goal of the US is not to start some stupid war that ends civilization. The primary enemy in this is the NATSEC ecosystem. I wish we could just buy them off by paying their Arlington mortgages, but it doesn't work that way.
If the CCP is nothing else, I'd say they are totalizing and ideological. Authoritarian, repressive, and illiberal in every sense of the word. Agree they both have headwinds, but so does the US. All legitimate threats will still have some headwinds, so just because a threat has headwinds doesn't mean you should ignore the threat.
Also wouldn't agree that great power conflict is obsolete. People argued that war was obsolete prior to WW1 and were obviously proved wrong. We've also banned weapons in the past and nuclear may be no different. A war for survival may result in MAD, but a war for territory where neither home country is threatened, say for Taiwan, could absolutely turn hot without turning nuclear.
Agreed Kennanism has been limited in the past. That's probably why Mead didn't include it in his original four types. But it does seem to be making a comeback due to the threat of China and Russia. I do think it was the driving force behind our Cold War foreign policy, even before and after Kissinger. Reagan and Kennedy may have added flairs of Wilsonian sentiment to bolster public support, but at their core the foreign policy actions all administrations took from the late 40's through the late 80's were centered on the containment doctrine.
Definitely agree that a mix of realism and idealism is needed for widespread public support. You see appeals to both in support for Ukraine. I'm curious which approach you think tends to lend itself best to progress and prosperity?
As for a foreign policy that is best for progress and prosperity, that is a tough one. I would guess some blend of Hamiltonianism plus Wilsonism justifications along with a strong dash of hubris to avoid getting into long expensive wars that we cannot win.
It is a tough question.
Kennan played an important role in waking up the State department and foreign policy experts as to the threat of the Soviet Union, but if you look at the specifics that he wanted, his influence was fairly limited. Truman did his own thing and most other presidents followed his lead.
I would argue that Truman, JFK, and LBJ all pushed hard on the ideals of fighting against Communists. Eisenhower and Truman less so.